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RISK AND DESIGN
JAMES E. KRIER*
R ISK springs from uncertainty,' uncertainty invites error, and, since
error can be costly, we would prefer to avoid it (provided, of course, that
avoidance is not more costly yet). While there is much in the Noll and
Krier article2 about judgmental error under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty, there is little about ways to avoid it. So avoidance-more accu-
rately, minimization-of error costs is the topic I want to address very
briefly and partially here.
As the discussion in Noll and Krier points out, cognitive psychologists
in particular have given us fairly systematic insights into judgmental er-
ror, and some commentators have seized on this knowledge as a new kind
of "market failure." Law professor Cass Sunstein, for example, uses
precisely those words in talking about "the enormous difficulties people
face in dealing with low-probability events. People tend to rely on heuris-
tics that lead to systemic errors." 3 Psychologist Paul Slovic and his col-
leagues make explicit what is probably implicit in Sunstein's remarks-
that this newfound source of market failure is a good reason for govern-
ment intervention in risk markets. In a review article on risk regulation,
they summarize the research regarding "difficulties people have in think-
ing intuitively about risk and uncertainty." The results of that research,
they observe, "run counter to the traditional presumptions of knowledge
and rationality that underlie economic approaches to decisionmaking
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Christine
Papajohn for giving direction to some of the ideas discussed in this commentary.
Classically, "risk" referred only to instances where probabilities are known, other
instances being regarded as "uncertain." See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and
Profit 19-20, 197-232 (1921). But this usage seems to have passed.
2 Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, in this issue.
' Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting the Regulatory State 46 ("market failure"), 47 (unpub-
lished manuscript, Univ. Chicago Law School, December 1988).
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XIX (June 1990)]
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under risk. In doing so, these results challenge the viability of market
mechanisms for managing risk and thereby suggest that institutional regu-
lation of risk is needed."
4
The irony of this remark is that the research findings in question could
(about) as well be cited in support ofjust the opposite conclusion, because
in addition to challenging the viability of the market in dealing with risk
they also challenge the viability of the government, as we shall see below.
On a parity of reasoning, then, the findings could be used to argue against
government intervention, rather than the other way around. Is this what I
wish to argue?
Not really, in part because there are reasons independent of cognitive
shortcomings that support the case for government regulation of risk. One
of these is externalities, as where A and B transact about risk and reach a
decision satisfactory to themselves but not to bystander C, who is not part
of the transactional (market) setting and whose interests A and B there-
fore tend to ignore. The literature surveyed in Noll and Krier suggests
that A and B might "mistransact" from the standpoint of their own inter-
ests because they process certain kinds of information in counterproduc-
tive ways. But even if A and B were perfect information processors, still
they could be expected to "mistransact" from the standpoint of C be-
cause C's interests, although material to socially appropriate risk deci-
sions, will be disregarded by A and B.
To deal with this externality problem, we typically resort to some sort
of regulatory device imposed from outside the market, some kind of pro-
gram of active governmental control. But even if the presence of exter-
nalities justifies these programs, still the programs might fail because of
the very same cognitive difficulties offered by Slovic and company as a
source of market failure. Rather than using these cognitive difficulties to
indict government intervention, however, 5 I want to consider some ways
regulatory programs might strive to limit their consequences so as to
avoid especially costly errors. My conclusion is that the two superficially
promising ways I have been moved to discuss are not really very promis-
4 Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, & Sarah Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychologi-
cal Perspective, in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 241, 242-43 (Roger G. Noll ed.
1985).
5 Whether one is talking about market failure caused by cognitive difficulties, exter-
nalities, or whatever, it never follows that the mere presence of these defects necessarily
means that government action is justified because-as mentioned in the text-the govern-
ment can fail, too, and sometimes for the very reasons that the market might. For the sake of
argument, I am taking government intervention as a given here, whether or not it happens to
be justified, in order to examine how government programs might be improved in certain
respects.
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ing after all. Risk, at bottom, is risky business, and for now I don't see
easy ways around that simple fact of life.
Ubiquity. As I read the relevant literature, cognitive failings under
conditions of risk and uncertainty are more or less ubiquitous-they are
human failings, and so they accompany humans not only into the market
but into the government as well. I say "more or less" in the foregoing
because, while I am sure that some humans are less apt to make judgmen-
tal errors than others, all humans make errors nevertheless, and some of
these errors can prove very costly. In other words, even "experts"-a
term for professional risk assessors-are vulnerable to the heuristics and
biases that plague good decisions in the realms of risk and uncertainty,
though they might be less vulnerable than lay people. Colin Camerer
notes this problem with experts in his commentary on Noll and Krier;6 the
cognitive psychology literature mentions the point regularly; 7 other litera-
ture elaborates.
8
Expert judgment, then, might represent an advance (though obviously
not a costless one)9 over lay judgment yet still fall far short of the ideal;
contrary to the implicit claim of Slovic and his coauthors, expertise is not
the easy path around cognitive difficulties because experts, too, face the
difficulties and hence, at times, make costly mistakes. One way to cope
with this problem focuses on improvements in the selection and training
of personnel, for the sake of better experts, but I leave that topic to
others. Another focuses on the design of regulatory systems, for the sake
of better institutions. Design is my interest here.
I shall consider two variations on the matter of design, each of which
acknowledges the ubiquity of errors in judgment and tries to avoid the
most costly mistakes. In that connection, imagine some proposed tech-
nology T that is thought to be (no one is absolutely certain) beneficial in
some respects and risky in others, and suppose that the issue is whether
to introduce the technology. Two kinds of mistake are possible: (1) weigh-
ing benefits against risks, T is on balance a good thing, but we mistakenly
decide to abandon it; (2) weighing benefits against risks, T is on balance a
6 Colin F. Camerer, Comment on Noll and Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psy-
chology for Risk Regulation," in this issue.
7 See, for example, Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 136 Sci. 280, 281 (1987); Baruch
Fischhoff, Managing Risk Perceptions, in Issues in Sci. & Tech., Fall 1985, at 83, 91.
s See, for example, J. Scott Armstrong, The Seer-Sucker Theory: The Value of Experts in
Forecasting, in Tech. Rev., June/July 1980, at 19; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier,
Risk, Courts, and Agencies, U. Pa. L. Rev. (in press).
9 There are, first of all, the direct costs of training and maintaining a corps of experts;
there are, in addition, the indirect political costs occasioned by the delegation of decision-
making authority to technocratic elites. For a sampling of the extensive literature on this last
category, see Gillette & Krier, supra note 8.
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bad thing, but we mistakenly decide to approve it. Call the first kind of
mistake a false positive because we ask whether T is too dangerous,
answer yes, and abandon the technology, but this is incorrect. Call the
second kind of mistake a false negative because we ask the same ques-
tion, answer no, and approve the technology, but now this is incorrect.10
Assume for the present (more on this later) that we are dealing with a
class of T's we believe to be of a kind where false negatives will generate
systematically higher error costs than false positives. If we are to err at
all, then, we should be inclined in these cases to err by abandoning a good
T rather than by approving a bad one. Since we know we will err from
time to time, we want to purposefully bias ourselves against false nega-
tives and in favor of false positives as the best approach in an unhappy
world of limited information. Consider several ways we can do this by
design.
The Architecture of Institutions. Economic and regulatory systems
can be designed with reference to what has been called their "architec-
ture," meaning essentially the relationship of various decision-making
authorities within a system. Sah and Stiglitz, for example, consider the
architectures of polyarchies and hierarchies. A polyarchy is defined "as a
system in which there are several (and possibly competing) decision mak-
ers who can undertake projects (or ideas) independently of one another.
In contrast, decision-making authority is more concentrated in a hierar-
chy in the sense that only a few individuals (or only one individual) can
undertake projects while others provide support in decision making." As
the authors suggest, the market is a prototypical polyarchy, whereas a
regulatory system is hierarchical."
True to the view I stated above, Sah and Stiglitz note that all individuals
make errors in judgment;' 2 their far more interesting observation is that
institutional architecture can affect the nature of the errors. In a market
to The terminology of false negatives and false positives tends to be used rather arbi-
trarily, and so, too, for the related terminology, "Type-I and Type-ll errors." Sah and
Stiglitz say: "All individuals make errors of judgment: some projects that get accepted
should have been rejected, and some projects are rejected that should have been accepted.
Using an analogy from the classical theory of statistical inference, these errors correspond
to Type-II and Type-I errors." Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The Architecture of
Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 716 (1986). For an
apparently contrary usage, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litiga-
tion, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. L., Econ., & Org. 99 (1989). We follow the
environmental risk literature and call Sah and Stiglitz's Type-II errors "false negatives."
See, for example, Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
Ecol. L. Q. 207, 219-20 (1978).
" Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 10, at 716.
12 id.
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with proprietary rights, for example, if one firm decides to go forth with a
T, no other firm may, whereas if one firm rejects a T, some other firm may
still choose to pursue it. In a certain form of regulatory hierarchy, on the
other hand, if a lower level of the hierarchy rejects a T, it is dead, whereas
otherwise review continues, and a higher level may decide to reject the T.
The total T's selected in a polyarchical market will thus consist of all T's
accepted separately by all firms, but the total T's selected in a hierarchical
regulatory system will consist only of the far smaller set of T's not re-
jected by some level of the hierarchy along the way.
Markets, then, have a comparative architectural advantage in approv-
ing proposed T's, and regulatory hierarchies a comparative architectural
advantage in rejecting them. Markets will approve more T's, good and
bad, than will regulatory hierarchies (designed as Sah and Stiglitz stipu-
late), which will in turn reject more T's, good and bad. As a result, the
incidence of false negatives should be relatively higher in the case of
markets, and the incidence of false positives relatively higher in the case
of governmental regulation. The latter is best at rejecting bad T's, for
which advantage is paid the price of good T's mistakenly forgone. 
13
I have assumed for now that the price of forgone good T's is worth
paying in the particular class of cases under discussion. Given that, the
very simplified account of Sah and Stiglitz's argument sketched above
provides explicit guidance regarding risk regulation. First, the account
makes a case for regulation through the government as opposed to the
market because hierarchies outperform polyarchies in avoiding false neg-
atives. (In fact, given the ubiquity of cognitive failure, the Sah and Stiglitz
account seems to make a better case for government regulation than does
the account of the cognitive psychologists, so long as we hold to the idea
that limiting false negatives is the dominant objective.) Second, the argu-
ment from architecture makes a case for a particular kind of government
regulation, namely, a kind where approval, but only approval, of a T by
some bureaucratic level allows further review and possible reversal by a
higher level; rejection at any level should be final and unreviewable.
Third, it follows that there is an obvious case for judicial review of regula-
tory activity so as to add an additional level to the hierarchical architec-
ture. Again, however, review should be of a particular kind: if an agency
rejects a T on the merits somewhere in the course of its decision process,
that decision should not be subject to scrutiny by the courts. Judicial
oversight should be confined to ultimate regulatory approvals.
The Burden of Proof. Another way to limit false negatives by design is
through careful assignment of the burden of proof. A commonplace ex-
13 Id. at 718-19.
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ample comes from the criminal law and concerns not false negatives but
false positives. The government is required to prove the guilt of a criminal
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt because this makes false positives,
erroneous convictions of the innocent, very unlikely. At the same time, of
course, the high burden of proof faced by the government also increases
the likelihood of false negatives (erroneous acquittals of the guilty), but
the argument is that we accept these as the necessary and worthwhile
price of protecting liberty-something to which we attach a considerable
premium.
If "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a way to limit false positives, then its
inverse is a way to limit false negatives. So Talbot Page has suggested that
shifts in the burdens and standards of proof can be used in the control of
T's that are regarded as especially risky from the standpoint of health,
safety, and the environment. The approach in such cases could be, for
example, that a T shall be abandoned where there is "at least a reasonable
doubt" about whether the T is, on balance, a good thing. 4
Bootstrapping. If error costs are generally believed in some particular
context to be systematically asymmetrical, if there is wide agreement
about the direction of asymmetry, and if an important objective is to limit
the more costly kinds of error, then the foregoing discussion suggests
several ways (no doubt there are others) to achieve the objective by
design. Choices among alternative designs would not necessarily be easy,
of course, because people might agree on the fact and direction of asym-
metry but disagree about its magnitude, and the magnitude of asymmetry
is relevant to details of design. (For example, we might opt for one stan-
dard of proof-such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt-or one kind of
hierarchy if we think that false negatives are way more costly than false
positives, but choose a different hierarchy or a less demanding standard
of proof-say clear and convincing evidence-if we think they are only
somewhat more costly.)
Even if there is agreement about the direction and magnitude of asym-
metry, still there might be arguments over issues of design. The architec-
ture of institutions and the fashioning of burdens of proof raise issues
beyond the minimization of error costs in states of risk and uncertainty.
Yet rarely, if at all, can designers unpackage institutions and tinker with
procedural rules for the sake of limiting error costs without altering them
in ways that might be regarded as undesirable from the standpoint of other
concerns. There is, for example, ideological debate about markets and
14 Page, supra note 10, at 234, 239. See also Talbot Page, On the Meaning of the Prepon-
derance Test in Judicial Regulation of Chemical Hazard, 46 L. & Contemp. Prob. 267
(Summer 1983).
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hierarchies-governmental hierarchies in particular-that proceeds on
grounds having nothing to do with the relationship between those institu-
tions and types and rates of error.1 5 Similarly, rules about burdens and
standards of proof may serve symbolic and ritualistic functions again
unrelated to avoiding mistakes.16 But even acknowledging all these
grounds for debate and controversy, a focus on design can inform deliber-
ations and generate alternative solutions to problems of uncertainty-so
long, at least, as there is fundamental agreement on the existence, direc-
tion, and magnitude of asymmetrical error costs and on the importance of
avoiding especially costly mistakes,
That's the rub. While I can suppose that everybody is interested in
minimizing the total costs of error (so long as doing so is not itself too
costly in other, say ideological, terms), I can hardly suppose that every-
body agrees about what kinds of errors cost how much. To the contrary,
debates about risk regulation in particular typically arise because there is
so much controversy about precisely those questions.
Go back, for instance, to my example regarding the regulation of a class
of T's, as to which there was agreement-this was assumed-that the
important thing was to avoid false negatives.1 7 In constructing the ex-
ample, I had in mind T's that pose risks of a familiar sort: ones where the
threatened harms, if they materialize, will be catastrophic and irreversible
but where materialization is very unlikely (has a very low probability). I
had in mind, in other words, so-called environmental risks like carcino-
genic chemicals, toxic wastes, nuclear fuels, and so forth.1 8 A common
view in the case of these risks is that error-cost minimization suggests we
should design around false negatives-precisely because they can prove
to be disastrous.' 9 Those who hold this view could take a cue from Sah
and Stiglitz and argue for the kind of regulatory structure and the kind of
judicial review discussed earlier;2" the objective would be to minimize
mistaken approvals of unduly dangerous T's.
" Some people, for example, might generally favor the market over regulation through
governmental hierarchies, even if higher error costs could attend the former, because they
believe that the market nourishes, and government intervention threatens, personal and
political freedom. See, for example, Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962).
Other people might be inclined against market ordering, even if it were thought to be
otherwise advantageous, on the view that market regimes unduly empower the well-to-do.
6 See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971).
'7 See the text after note 10 supra.
18 The terminology of "environmental risk" is suggested by Page, supra note 10, at 207.
'9 See, for example, id. at 233-41.
20 See the text after note 13 supra.
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But obviously, when we cautiously reject a possibly very dangerous T,
we necessarily (if only implicitly) approve some other T* at the same
time, namely the preexisting T* that the new T would have displaced.
This preexisting T* may in its own way be dangerous, too-say because it
has bad side effects, or because it controls a bad disease much less suc-
cessfully than would the new T, or both. If the old T* is more dangerous
on balance than the new T, then caution proves to be foolhardy, and the
perfect becomes the enemy of the better.
A large band of apparently well-trained and well-informed people make
just this argument. Their claim is that the technological status quo is often
not nearly as safe as the proposed technologies that society too often bans
in the name of safety. In our terms, their claim is that efforts to limit false
negatives in the case of environmental risks come at much too high a
price, that we should be more concerned with avoiding false positives and
act accordingly. Peter Huber, for example, categorically asserts that
newly developed technologies are on balance less risky than existing ones
and that highly centralized, large-scale, complex technologies are supe-
rior in the same terms to simpler or decentralized alternatives.2" High
technologies can, of course, have catastrophic effects, but simple tech-
nologies can, too, so the false negative/false positive problem is symmet-
rical. Even a bathtub filled with water can threaten disaster, Huber says,
because "in a 'worst conceivable accident' the citizens of the nation
might line up in front of the tub and drown themselves, one at a time."
22
(The same point has been made, but much more credibly, with respect to
such technologies as recombinant DNA.)
23
Whether a technologically optimistic view like Huber's is correct, I
21 Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 307 (1985).
22 Id. at 313.
23 See, for example, Stephen P. Stich, The Recombinant DNA Debate, 7 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
187, 191 (1978): "Just as there is a non-zero probability that unforeseen consequences of
recombinant DNA research will lead to disaster, so there is a non-zero probability that
unforeseen consequences of failing to pursue the research will lead to disaster" (emphasis in
original).
Enthusiasts of technological advance can be expected to favor the market as a chief means
to control the development of technology because-in the terms of Sah and Stiglitz-
polyarchies promote innovation, whereas hierarchical regulation might bring undersirable
costs: "good projects get rejected in the process of ensuring that bad projects do not get
undertaken." Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 10, at 726. Even when technological enthusiasts
concede the case for regulation, they argue that reviewing courts overseeing the regulatory
process should at least defer to agency decisions that approve new technologies. See, for
example, Huber, supra note 21, at 332-35, and contrast the discussion in the text after note 13
supra. For a critique of Huber's views in this and other respects, see Gillette & Krier, supra
note 8.
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cannot say.24 What I can say with utter confidence is that it is as widely
held as the opposite view that modern technologies, notwithstanding their
genuine benefits, are frightfully risky and thus best approached in very
guarded fashion. Hence we can identify a fundamental disagreement that
has to be resolved prior to settling on an appropriate architecture for the
regulation of risk. The disagreement itself reflects uncertainty and might
be resolved erroneously. Yet, so far as I can see, about this kind of error
institutional architecture can contribute little, if anything.
Exactly the same problem arises when we turn from architecture to
another aspect of design-the burden of proof. Consider Page's sugges-
tion, alluded to earlier, that "when the potential adverse effects of an
environmental risk are many times greater than the potential benefits, a
proper standard of proof of danger under the expected cost minimization
criterion may be that there is only 'at least a reasonable doubt' that the
adverse effect will occur, rather than requiring a greater probability, such
as 'more likely than not,' that the effect will occur." 25 Grant the premise
of this statement, and everyone might agree with it, more or less. The
premise, though, is itself something in question because seldom do we
know for sure that "the potential adverse effects of an environmental risk
are many times greater than the potential benefits." As we saw just
above, people are of strongly different minds on this general issue. In
consequence, there is once again an issue of fact that must be resolved
prior to choosing any standard of proof, but this issue of fact (like all
issues of fact) must itself be resolved by an appeal to some standard of
proof. Who then shall carry the burden of proving, and to what degree,
that a given T is in the class of T's whose risks may be established by a
relaxed burden of proof? We enter an infinite regress.
Conclusion. Design offers a good way to deal with some kinds of risks
and uncertainties once other kinds of risks and uncertainties are resolved.
So once there is agreement, say, that certain specified kinds of tech-
nologies are best approached with a view to limiting false negatives, de-
sign tells us much about how to contain the costs of inevitable errors in
judgment. Unhappily, though, current debates about risk reveal strikingly
different attitudes about the pros and cons of various risk sources. Have
24 I am, however, skeptical. See James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case
for Technological Optimism, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 405 (1985).
25 Page, supra note 10, at 239. Page appears to acknowledge the difficulty I go on to
discuss in the text. See id. at 235: "For many environmental risks it is difficult even to define
a candidate which might be or might become a false negative, much less to design an
institutional structure which would take the chance of a false negative into account as well as
the chance of a false positive. The search for environmental risk candidates and false
negatives remains an underdeveloped art, and each case is different."
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the government seek to prosecute a citizen, and all of us see precious
liberty threatened. But have the government seek to "prosecute" a chem-
ical, and reactions vary in the extreme. For some people, prosecution
shows a cautious concern about danger, while for others it reflects a
reckless disregard of safety. The truth of the matter is uncertain, and this
uncertainty cannot be resolved by design. Design safeguards can be sensi-
bly introduced only after we know the relative costs of false positives and
false negatives. Design provides no guidance on the hotly contested prior
question, Which set of errors carries the greatest risks?
